February 3, 2026 · Epoch 424944 Analysis
A 6-minute window on Ethereum mainnet reveals a stark economic reality: 527 blob transactions waited in the mempool, but only 25% of blocks included them. The rest were excluded not by censorship, but by cold market math.
On February 2, 2026, between 03:24 and 03:28 UTC, Ethereum epoch 424944 unfolded like any other: 32 slots, 32 blocks, all proposed successfully. But beneath the surface, something unusual was happening with blob inclusion.
Only 8 of the 32 slots (25%) included blob transactions. The remaining 24 slots (75%) contained zero blobs—despite the mempool containing 527 blob transactions waiting to be included.
Using the default.mempool_transaction table from Xatu data, I analyzed all blob transactions (type=3) observed during the epoch timeframe:
| Time (UTC) | Blobs | Priority Fee | Type |
|---|---|---|---|
| 03:20:02.079 | 1 | 75,600 wei | Low-fee rollup |
| 03:20:08.310 | 3 | 5 gwei | High-priority |
| 03:20:22.354 | 5 | 2.5 gwei | Mid-priority |
| 03:20:14.389 | 1 | 151,200 wei | Low-fee rollup |
Examining the 8 slots that did include blobs:
| Slot | Blobs | Proposer | Relay |
|---|---|---|---|
| 13,598,223 | 2 | Lido | Flashbots |
| 13,598,224 | 21 | Lido | Flashbots |
| 13,598,226 | 21 | Whale | Unknown |
| 13,598,227 | 19 | Stader | Unknown |
| 13,598,229 | 21 | 135979 | Unknown |
| 13,598,230 | 21 | 891020 | Unknown |
| 13,598,233 | 1 | Bitfinex | Unknown |
| 13,598,235 | 21 | Whale | Flashbots |
Comparing a blob block vs a non-blob block from the same epoch reveals the stark economic incentive:
MEV reward
21 blobs included
Flashbots relay
320 transactions
MEV reward
0 blobs included
Ultra Sound relay
34 transactions
The non-blob block was worth 30x more to the validator. This is not censorship—this is rational economic behavior.
The upcoming Fusaka upgrade includes EIP-7918, which introduces a blob base fee floor. This mechanism ties blob fees to L1 gas demand, ensuring blob fees don't drop to meaningless levels.
The slots without blobs came from a diverse set of validators:
The random distribution across all major staking entities strongly suggests economic behavior, not targeted censorship.
Two builders were observed in this epoch:
Both builders made economically rational decisions based on mempool contents.
400+ blob transactions were excluded from epoch 424944 despite being available in the mempool. This was not due to censorship or technical failure—it was the result of fee market dynamics where high-value regular transactions outcompeted low-fee blob transactions.
The data shows blob demand exists (527 transactions waiting), but current fee structures don't align incentives. The Fusaka upgrade's EIP-7918 blob fee floor may address this by establishing minimum viable pricing for blob data availability.
default.mempool_transaction from Xatu (ethpandaops ClickHouse)mainnet.fct_block_blob_count_head from Xatu